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Could Multiple Personality Disorder Explain Life, the Universe and Everything?

by Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree and Edward F. KellyScientific Americanpublished

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gist

Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree, and Edward F. Kelly use clinical dissociative identity disorder as an analogy for idealism: one universal consciousness could split into many private minds the way one psyche forms alters. Physicalism fails the hard problem; constitutive panpsychism fails the combination problem. Cosmopsychist idealism needs an account of private selves—and DID shows consciousness can host concurrent distinct identities. They posit that metabolizing life is what universal-level dissociation looks like from outside.

ideas

  • DID is neurally real. Blind alters suppress visual EEG; patient scans differ from actors simulating DID.
  • Physicalism stalls on qualities. Mass, spin, and charge do not entail what warmth or redness feel like—the hard problem.
  • Constitutive panpsychism stalls on combination. Tiny subjectivities do not coherently fuse into one human point of view.
  • Idealism needs many-from-one. Universal consciousness must explain private concurrent minds; DID supplies the empirical pattern.
  • Life as extrinsic dissociation. Organisms are what universal-level alters look like from outside, as brains show DID signatures.

quotes

we may all be alters—dissociated personalities—of universal consciousness.

Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree, and Edward F. Kelly, stating the cosmopsychist claim.

metabolizing organisms are simply what universal-level dissociative processes look like.

Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree, and Edward F. Kelly, identifying life with dissociation's extrinsic appearance.

there is something rather particular that dissociative processes look like in the brain.

Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree, and Edward F. Kelly, on DID's neural fingerprint.

A key problem of physicalism, however, is its inability to make sense of how our subjective experience of qualities

Bernardo Kastrup, Adam Crabtree, and Edward F. Kelly, introducing the hard problem.